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Introduction and Tribute to Yasuhei Taniguchi
It was a tremendous pleasure to participate in a symposium that
honored one of the giants of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appel-
late Body-Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi. Professor Taniguchi served as a
distinguished member of the Appellate Body from 2000 to 2007, during
which time he served on the division for twenty-one appeals, many of them
addressing landmark issues.1 In tribute to him, this article focuses on an
issue that was a key element in the last dispute on which Professor
Taniguchi served as member of the Appellate Body. This dispute con-
cerned Brazil's restrictions on imports of retreaded tires and raised impor-
tant questions about the relationship between regional trade agreements
and commitments to the WTO. 2
The subject of this article-the relationship between the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms of various free trade agreements, customs unions or
regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding3 -is one that has already seen considerable debate among
scholars. 4 This debate is poised to become more relevant and more intense
with the proliferation of free trade agreements and RTAs.
This article outlines the most common types of dispute settlement
mechanisms contained in RTAs and the problems that can arise from the
overlap or conflict between these RTA dispute settlement provisions and
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. This article also dis-
cusses the most recent case in which such a conflict arose-the Appellate
Body's report in Brazil Tyres. In Brazil Tyres, the Appellate Body examined
Brazil's ban on the importation of used and retreaded tires and the exemp-
tion from that ban that Brazil adopted to implement an adverse ruling from
a decision of an RTA dispute settlement tribunal.5 Brazil contended that
the WTO panel was correct in finding that Brazil's exemption from the ban
for certain retreaded tires was permissible because it was mandated by a
Mercado Comin del Sur (MERCOSUR) tribunal. 6 The Appellate Body
reversed the panel, finding that taking action to comply with a MERCOSUR
dispute settlement panel did not necessarily provide sufficient justification
1. WTO, Dispute Settlement-Appellate Body Members: Biography, http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/ab members bio.e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
2. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report].
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
4. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the
Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 362 (2006); Marc L. Busch,
Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade,
61 INT'L ORG. 735 (2007).
5. See generally Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2.
6. Id. T°I 62-65. MERCOSUR is the Mercado Comun del Sur (Southern Common
Market), a regional trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay,
founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, as amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty
of Ouro Preto. Id. at Abbreviations Chart.
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for Brazil's action.7 Brazil was still required to meet the requirements of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO covered
agreements, particularly, in this case, the chapeau of Article XX.8 This arti-
cle concludes that there are a number of problems that can arise-or have
already arisen-due to the overlap in dispute settlement processes between
the WTO and RTAs, and WTO members should take immediate action
under the Doha Round mandate to address these conflicts and clarify the
legal relationship between RTA and WTO dispute settlement provisions.
I. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements
There is no denying the explosive growth in the number of regional
free trade, or preferential trade, agreements. The first forty-five years of the
GATT 9 (the period between 1948 and the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round in 1994) saw a total of 124 notifications to the GATT of RTAs. 10 In
the fourteen years since its inception, the WTO has received notification of
more than twice as many additional RTAs-a total of 380 RTAs as of July
2007.11 If one considers the RTAs that are in force but not yet notified to
the WTO, those signed but not yet in force, and those in the negotiating or
proposed stage, there are likely to be more than 400 RTAs in force by
2010.12 The vast majority (90%) of these are free trade agreements or par-
tial scope agreements, while the remaining RTAs are customs union agree-
ments.' 3 Substantively, most of these agreements concern the same issues
as various WTO agreements-touching on trade in goods and services,
intellectual property, customs and valuation provisions, sanitary and
phytosanitary provisions (SPS provisions), technical barriers to trade, agri-
cultural issues, and the ubiquitous provisions for preferential tariff levels.
Virtually all of these free trade or partial scope agreements contain
some form of dispute settlement mechanism. Although there are consider-
able differences in these provisions and the type of dispute resolution
processes they establish, the various systems can generally be characterized
as one of the following: 1) choice of forum agreements, with or without a
further requirement granting exclusive jurisdiction to the forum chosen
first; 2) exclusive jurisdiction agreements, which require all disputes aris-
ing under the RTA to be brought only under the RTA's dispute settlement
mechanism; or 3) preference agreements, which specify a preferred forum
that can be changed to an alternative forum only upon agreement among
7. Id. 1[ 232-233.
8. See id. ' 232.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
10. WTO, Regional Trade Agreements-Facts and Figures: How Many Regional
Trade Agreements Have Been Notified to the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
.e/region e/regfac-e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
11. WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region
.e/region e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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the parties. 1 4 Most of the RTAs notified to date are of the first type, provid-
ing for a choice of forum that allows the complaining party to choose
whether to bring a claim under the dispute settlement mechanism of the
RTA or under- the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). A sig-
nificant number of these choice of forum provisions go on to require that
once a dispute has been initiated in a given forum, the same dispute cannot
be initiated in the other forum. 15
II. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding's Article 23 Versus WTO
Member Rights Under GATT Article XXIV 1 6
The existence and nature of the dispute settlement provisions in many
RTAs may raise questions about their consistency with the WTO-particu-
larly Article 23 of the WTO's dispute settlement provisions. Article 23 pro-
vides that: "When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements
or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agree-
ments, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures
of this Understanding."'17
A number of scholars have argued that Article 23 should be read to
mean that the DSU has "not only compulsory jurisdiction over matters aris-
14. Some agreements, most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), provide a preference for only certain provisions of the agreement. See gener-
ally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 2005 of NAFTA includes a preference for NAFTA
resolution of disputes involving environmental, SPS, or standards-related measures and
further declares that if the complaining party has already started WTO procedures on
these matters, the defendant can insist that the WTO complaint be withdrawn. Id. art.
2005, paras. 1-5. All other matters, except disputes involving final anti-dumping or
countervailing determinations, are subject to a more traditional choice of forum clause
in which the complaining party can choose whether to bring the case to the WTO dis-
pute settlement system or a NAFTA panel; but once the forum is chosen, it is to be used
to the exclusion of the other. Id. art. 2005.
15. A comprehensive chart outlining the dispute settlement mechanisms in most
RTAs notified to the WTO can be found in the Annex to Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle
Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the WTO and RTAs (Apr. 26,
2002) (paper presented at World Trade Organization Conference on Regional Trade
Agreements), available at http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/regione/semapril02
e/marceau.pdf.
16. The agreement creating the WTO included the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), which is based on the original text of the GATT 1947. See
Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARv. INT' L.J. 419, 421 & n.9 (2001); see also
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. GATT 1994
includes Article XXIV of the GATT 1947, subject to the Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Cho, supra; see also Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XX1V of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1161 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV].
17. DSU art. 23.1.
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ing under the covered agreements, [but that] it also [has] exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such matters." 18 In so doing, these scholars claim that Article 23
requires that if a WTO member seeks redress for violations of obligations
under the covered agreements, it must use DSU procedures. 19 Conse-
quently, once a request for a panel is made, the panel is automatically
established and the rulings of that panel or of the Appellate Body are
legally binding on the parties. 20
If Article 23 does, in fact, provide compulsory and exclusive jurisdic-
tion to resolve disputes involving the WTO covered agreements, one may
ask whether RTAs with substantive provisions that are similar to the WTO
but which have the effect of requiring resolution of a dispute by the RTA's
dispute settlement process-either by compulsion or by being the first cho-
sen exclusive forum-deprive parties of the right of access to the WTO's
dispute settlement process. The flip-side of this issue is whether the WTO
should be concerned by RTA members who initiate WTO dispute settle-
ment proceedings in possible violation of their RTA obligations. 2 1
To date, there has been little clarification of the exact legal relationship
between the RTA dispute settlement systems and the DSU. Article XXIV of
the GATT clearly acknowledges the existence of RTAs within the GATT/
WTO system.2 2 As such, WTO members are allowed to use RTA dispute
settlement mechanisms to settle disputes under WTO-compatible RTAs.
Yet, the growing overlap in the substantive obligations and multiple dispute
settlement forums raise many questions about the nature of the legal rela-
tionship between these international agreements. Because Article 23 of the
DSU provides that WTO violations can only be resolved through the
18. Debra P. Steger, The Jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization, 98 Am. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 142, 143 (2004).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. The issue has come to the fore in a number of cases in which RTA dispute settle-
ment mechanisms have overlapped with WTO provisions. For example, as part of the
so-called "sugar wars" between the United States and Mexico, Mexico filed a dispute
under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA; but the United States did not agree on panelists. David
A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportuni-
ties and Risks for the NAFTA Parties, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1025, 1073 (1999). Mexico
then imposed a series of taxes on soft drinks that used a sweetener other than cane
sugar, which the United States challenged under the WTO. See Appellate Body Report,
Mexico- Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 2, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar.
6, 2006). Mexico argued that the WTO panel should refuse to resolve the dispute in
light of Mexico's efforts to initiate NAFTA Chapter 20 proceedings. Id. 3. The Appel-
late Body held that the panel could not decline to exercise jurisdiction and that the
WTO had no basis to determine whether or not the United States had acted consistently
with its NAFTA obligations. Id. 1I 53, 56.
22. Article XXIV provides: "Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area," and goes on to impose three
conditions for such arrangements. GATT art. XXIV:5. The Appellate Body Report in
Turkey- Textiles addressed the issue of demonstrating that the free trade agreement or
customs union meets the conditions set forth in Article XXIV. Appellate Body Report,
Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, I 60-63, WT/DS34/
AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999).
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WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, it is not clear that a WTO panel can
decline jurisdiction because an RTA is a more convenient forum, has more
specific rules, is already considering a case on the same claim, or has
already adjudicated the matter. 23
III. The Brazil Tyres Dispute
Some of these jurisdictional issues arose very directly in the most
recent Appellate Body case that Professor Taniguchi helped to resolve-Bra-
zil Tyres-involving a Brazilian ban on imported tires. 24 Because they are
breeding grounds for mosquitoes, and because their disposal (particularly
by burning) causes additional adverse effects, Brazil imposed an import
ban on retreaded tires as part of its efforts to reduce the volume of tire
waste and the "risks to human, animal, and plant life and health" associ-
ated with waste tires. 25  Uruguay challenged the import ban in
MERCOSUR arbitral proceedings, claiming that the ban on imports of
retreaded tires constituted a new restriction of commerce between the par-
ties, "which was incompatible with Brazil's obligations under
MERCOSUR. ' ' 26 The MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal found that Brazil's
import ban was incompatible with MERCOSUR regulations. 2 7 Following
the arbitral decision, Brazil enacted new provisions that exempted from the
import ban certain retreaded tires (referred to as remolded tires) originat-
ing in MERCOSUR countries. 2
8
The European Communities (EC) then filed a WTO challenge against
both the import ban and the exemption. 2 9 The EC claimed that the Brazil-
ian measures were inconsistent with, among other things, the GATT prohi-
bition on quantitative restrictions (Article XI). 30 Brazil acknowledged that
its import ban and associated fines were inconsistent with Article X1, but
contended that its import ban was justified under Article XX(b) of the
GATT as a measure necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.3 1 Brazil also claimed that the fines associated with the import ban
23. See DSU art. 23. For example, the panel in Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping
Duties on Poultry from Brazil stated that panels are not bound to follow the rulings of
RTA panel proceedings, even if the proceedings involve the same measures. Panel
Report, Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, 9 7.41, WT/
DS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003). There, a MERCOSUR panel had ruled in Argentina's favor.
Id. In the subsequent WTO case brought by Brazil, Argentina claimed that the panel
could not disregard the precedents set forth in the MERCOSUR proceedings. Id. The
panel rejected those claims stating, "[Tihere is no basis in Article 3.2 of the DSU, or any
other provision, to suggest that we are bound to rule in a particular way .... [W]e see
no reason at all why we should be bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement
bodies." Id.
24. See generally Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2.
25. Id. 9 119.
26. Id. 122 n.163.
27. Id.
28. Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 9 2.14, WT/
DS332/R (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Tyres, Panel Report].
29. Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, ' 2.
30. Id. 123; see also GATT art. XI.
31. Brazil Tyres, Panel Report, supra note 28, 4.9; see also GATT art. XX(b).
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were justified under Article XX(d) as necessary to secure compliance with
the import ban and its regulations. 3 2 The EC countered that Article XX
permits such measures only if they meet the terms of the chapeau of Arti-
cle XX, particularly the provision that measures cannot be applied in a
manner which constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail."'33 The EC claimed
that to exempt imports only from MERCOSUR countries constituted arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries that are members
of MERCOSUR and those that are not.
3 4
First, the Brazil Tyres panel examined the terms "arbitrary" and "unjus-
tifiable" and stated that, in the context of Article XX, these terms "sug-
gest[ed], overall, the need to be able to 'defend' or convincingly explain the
rationale for any discrimination in the application of the measure. '3 5 The
panel noted that Brazil enacted the exemption only after a MERCOSUR
dispute settlement tribunal found Brazil's restrictions on the importation
of retreaded tires to constitute a new restriction on trade prohibited under
MERCOSUR.3 6 For the panel, the MERCOSUR exemption did "not seem to
be motivated by capricious or unpredictable reasons. It was adopted fur-
ther to a ruling within the framework of MERCOSUR, which has binding
legal effects for Brazil, as a party to MERCOSUR. ' '3 7 The panel added that
the discrimination was not "a priori unreasonable," because the discrimi-
nation arose in the context of an agreement that "inherently provide[d] for
preferential treatment in favour of its members, thus leading to discrimina-
tion between those members and other countries. ' 38 The panel ruled in
Brazil's favor after concluding that the MERCOSUR dispute settlement rul-
ing provided a reasonable basis for enacting the MERCOSUR exemption,
implying that any discrimination resulting from the exemption was not
arbitrary. 39
The EC then challenged various aspects of the panel report before the
WTO Appellate Body, including the panel's finding that the MERCOSUR
exemption did not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination con-
trary to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.40 The EC contended
that the panel erred in its definition of "arbitrary" as acts that are "capri-
32. Brazil Tyres, Panel Report, supra note 28, 9 4.425; see also GATT art. XX(d).
33. GATT art. XX; see Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, H 27, 31.
The chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ....
GATT art. XX.
34. Brazil Tyres, Panel Report, supra note 28, 9 4.448.
35. Id. 9 7.260.
36. Id. q 7.271.
37. Id. 9 7.272.
38. Id. 1 7.273.
39. Id. 9 7.281.
40. Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 9 27.
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cious," "unpredictable" or "random. '4 1 Furthermore, the EC argued that
just because the exemption was in response to the MERCOSUR dispute
settlement ruling did not mean that the exemption was consistent with
Article XX. 42 The EC claimed that the objective of the measure at issue
should be taken into account when determining whether the measure
involves arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 43 According to the EC, a
measure will not be arbitrary if it "appears as reasonable, predictable and
foreseeable" in light of its objective. 44
Conversely, Brazil claimed that the following considerations identified
by the panel demonstrated that the MERCOSUR exemption did not
amount to arbitrary discrimination:
(i) Brazil introduced the exemption only after a dispute settlement tribunal
established under MERCOSUR ruled that the ban violated Brazil's obliga-
tions under MERCOSUR; (ii) the MERCOSUR ruling was adopted in the con-
text of an agreement intended to liberalize trade that is expressly recognized
in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; (iii) agreements of the type recognized by
Article XXIV inherently provide for discrimination; (iv) Brazil had an obliga-
tion under international law to implement the ruling by the MERCOSUR
tribunal; (v) Brazil applied the MERCOSUR ruling in the most narrow way
possible, that is, by exempting imports of a particular kind of retreaded tyres
(remoulded) from the application of the ban; and (vi) it was not reasonable
for Brazil to implement the MERCOSUR ruling with respect to imports from
all sources, because doing so would have forced Brazil to abandon its policy
objective and its chosen level of protection.45
As a result, Brazil claimed that the panel had correctly determined that
these circumstances provided a rational basis for the MERCOSUR
exemption. 46
Although the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that Brazil's com-
pliance with the MERCOSUR ruling could not be called capricious or ran-
dom, its analysis did not end there.4 7 The Appellate Body went on to state
that discrimination can result from a rational decision or behavior and still
be arbitrary or unjustifiable "because it is explained by a rationale that
bears no relationship to the objective of a measure provisionally justified
under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, or goes against that objective."'48
In this case, the parties agreed that the objective of the measure at issue
was the protection of life and the decrease of health risks from mosquito-
borne diseases and tire fires.4 9 The Appellate Body thus found that the
exemption's origins in a MERCOSUR ruling did not fully justify the dis-
crimination caused by the exemption.5 0 The Appellate Body noted that
41. Id. 1 29.
42. Id. 41 31.
43. Id. 91 220.
44. Id. (internal citation omitted).
45. Id. ' 65.
46. Id. 91 222.
47. Id. 9 232.
48. Id.
49. See id. 9191 7, 56, 119.
50. Id. 9 228.
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because the exemption permitted more tires to be imported into Brazil, "it
[bore] no relationship to the legitimate objective pursued by the Import
Ban that [fell] within the purview of Article XX(b), and even [went] against
this objective."'5 1 The Appellate Body concluded that the MERCOSUR
exemption resulted in the application of the import ban in a manner that
constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 52
One final paragraph in the Appellate Body's report merits further scru-
tiny. One of the EC's arguments was that Brazil should have defended its
import ban in the MERCOSUR proceedings by invoking Article 50(d) of
the Treaty of Montevideo, 5 3 which provides for an exception to
MERCOSUR commitments similar to that provided in Article XX(b) of
GATT 1994.5 4 Brazil had not invoked this provision or made the claim in
the MERCOSUR proceedings that the import ban was related to human
health and safety.5 5 The Appellate Body noted that it was not appropriate
for it to second-guess Brazil's decision not to invoke the Treaty of Monte-
video. 56 It went on to state:
However, Article 50(d) of the Treaty of Montevideo, as well as the fact that
Brazil might have raised this defence in the MERCOSUR arbitral proceed-
ings, show, in our view, that the discrimination associated with the
MERCOSUR exemption does not necessarily result from a conflict between
provisions under MERCOSUR and the GATT .... 57
The Appellate Body continued to address this issue of potential con-
flicts between the WTO and RTAs by adding the following footnote:
In addition, we note that Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 exempts,
where necessary, measures permitted under Article XX from the obligation
to eliminate "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce" with
respect to "substantially all the trade" within a customs union. Therefore, if
we assume, for the sake of argument, that MERCOSUR is consistent with
Article XXIV and that the Import Ban meets the requirements of Article XX,
this measure, where necessary, could be exempted by virtue of Article
XXIV:8(a) from the obligation to eliminate other restrictive regulations of
commerce within a customs union.5 8
As such, the decisions of the panel-both those affirmed and those over-
turned by the Appellate Body in its final report-spawned a number of




53. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association,
Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter Treaty of Montevideo].
54. Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 91 234 & n.443; see Treaty of
Montevideo, supra note 53, art. 50(d).
55. Brazil Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 9 234.
56. Id.
57. Id. (internal citations omitted).
58. Id. 9 234 n.445.
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IV. Issues Raised by Conflicts and Forum Choices
A. Jurisdiction of WTO over Non-WTO Law?
An immediate question arises from the overlap in the substantive areas
covered by RTAs and the WTO: do WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have the power to take non-WTO law (such as the text of an RTA or the
decisions of RTA dispute settlement panels) into account, and should they
exercise that power when resolving a WTO dispute? The rules and proce-
dures of the DSU allow the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to resolve con-
flicts that involve the rights and obligations contained in the WTO covered
agreements. 59 The decisions of the DSB are not to add to or diminish the
rights and obligations of WTO members. 60 Furthermore, it is firmly
established that WTO panels do not have the authority to enforce provi-
sions of an RTA directly.6 1 Nonetheless, there exists uncertainty as to
whether RTA law can be, or should be, taken into account or treated differ-
ently than other non-WTO law-both because RTAs are explicitly recog-
nized in Article XXIV of the GATT, and because the substantive law of
RTAs generally mirrors or even replicates the language of the WTO covered
agreements.
From the beginning, the Appellate Body has recognized that WTO law
cannot exist wholly apart from public international law.6 2 Some scholars
have emphasized that in the instance of an RTA, the parties to the dispute
have entered into an international agreement that exists concurrently with
the WTO and expresses their rights and obligations. 63 As a result, these
scholars have argued that the DSU does not necessarily add to or take away
from those parties' rights and obligations if it takes into account the law of
a given RTA in resolving a dispute.6
4
B. Duplicative Proceedings and/or Conflicting Rulings
A second immediate concern is the potential for duplicative proceed-
ings at considerable expense to those states involved. For example, in the
most recent dispute between Canada and the United States over trade in
softwood lumber-involving countervailing duty and anti-dumping mea-
sures-Canada brought four separate WTO disputes, three NAFTA panel
proceedings under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, and a separate Chapter 11
NAFTA claim; an Extraordinary Challenge of the Chapter 19 decisions was
also heard, and the industries on both sides of the border brought follow-
up litigation in the U.S. courts.
6 5
59. DSU art. 3.2.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., US-Margins of Preference (Aug. 9, 1949), II GATT B.I.S.D. at 11 (1952).
62. See DSU art. 3.2.
63. See Steger, supra note 18, at 144 (commenting on the views ofJoost Pauwelyn).
64. See id.
65. See generally Chi Carmody, Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006), 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 664 (2006). Chapter 19 of the NAFTA treaty governs disputes over final anti-
dumping and countervailing duty determinations, while the general dispute settlement
provisions of Chapter 20 govern other NAFTA disputes. See discussion supra note 14.
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A panel of the WTO upheld the revised U.S. injury determination,
while a NAFTA panel considering the same issue found that the injury
determination was not supported by sufficient evidence-resulting in con-
flicting rulings.6 6 Although the Appellate Body subsequently overturned
the panel's conclusion, 67 the potential for contradictory rulings is evident.
Both parties in a dispute can be expected to press the decision of one
forum's panel onto the other panel when those decisions work in their
favor.
In Brazil Tyres, the EC made a number of arguments about the claims
Brazil raised or did not raise before the MERCOSUR tribunal. The EC
argued that Brazil was at least partially responsible for the ruling that
resulted in the MERCOSUR exemption because it did not defend itself in
the MERCOSUR proceedings on grounds related to human health and
safety. 68 The panel did not find this argument persuasive.6 9 The panel
considered that it would not be appropriate for it "to assess in detail the
choice of arguments by Brazil in the MERCOSUR proceedings or to second-
guess the outcome of the case in light of Brazil's litigation strategy in those
proceedings." 70
C. Res Judicata?
Res judicata, the doctrine that a final judgment rendered by a compe-
tent court on the merits is conclusive and constitutes a bar to subsequent
action on the same claim, 7 1 is woven into a number of RTAs. The inclusion
of this principle raises the issue of whether a WTO dispute should be con-
sidered an appeal or relitigation of a claim that has already been adjudi-
cated by an RTA panel. If so, one could argue that by agreeing to res
judicata provisions, parties to an RTA either effectively strip the WTO of
jurisdiction or risk violating the terms of the RTA if they bring a WTO case.
D. Good Faith
A question related to res judicata is whether it should be considered
bad faith to bring a dispute before one forum, receive a final judgment, and
then initiate a second proceeding before a second forum if dissatisfied with
the first ruling. Article 3.10 of the DSU requires good faith, 72 but to date,
violations of exclusive forum provisions have not been viewed as substan-
tive violations of WTO law. Therefore, if a member brings a subsequent
66. See Jennifer Lan, U.S. and Canadian Trade War over Softwood Lumber: The Contin-
uing Dispute, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 209, 214-16 (2007).
67. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, 11 144-147, WT/
DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006).
68. Brazil Tyres, Panel Report, supra note 28, ( 7.275.
69. Id.
70. Id. q 7.276. "In a similar case between Argentina and Uruguay, the tribunal also
reached the conclusion that the restriction was unjustified, despite the invocation of the
relevant exception by Argentina in those proceedings." Id. ' 7.276 n.1451.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27 (1982).
72. See DSU art. 3.10.
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WTO case after an RTA case, such actions have not been found to be viola-
tions of the WTO's good faith provision.
E. Preclusion of Defenses
Many RTAs contain more specific provisions that could be viewed as
lex specialis provisions. An issue thus arises as to whether WTO members
can raise provisions of an RTA as a defense in WTO cases.
73
F. Impact on Third Parties
Because of the proliferation of RTAs and the degree of substantive
overlap between RTAs and the WTO, the problem of third-party rights is
growing. Article XXIV does not require that an RTA or its dispute settle-
ment mechanism take into account the rights or opportunities of third par-
ties to participate in the dispute settlement, while the WTO's DSU
provisions do provide for third-party participation.7 4 Many of the deci-
sions of RTA tribunals could impact third parties. Therefore, these third
parties may need to bring a separate dispute before the WTO to protect
their interests if they are affected by proceedings before an RTA tribunal.
V. Can or Should the Overlaps or Conflicts Be Addressed? How?
Members of the WTO have recognized many problems created by the
"spaghetti bowl" of overlapping trade agreements outside the WTO. 75 The
Doha Declaration includes a negotiating mandate to clarify and improve
"disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying
to regional trade agreements."' 76 As such, WTO members could adopt any
number of the approaches suggested by various scholars to address the
problems of overlaps and conflicts with RTAs. 77 Each of these suggestions,
however, raises its own significant problems. Particularly, these sugges-
tions present questions of how far the WTO can or should go in taking
account of the law, evidence, or decisions of any given subset of its mem-
bers and what risks the WTO takes in giving up jurisdiction to decide
basic questions of international trade law. Among the ideas suggested for
possible resolution of conflicts are:
73. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and
Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 254-255 (2004) (discussing argu-
ments and conditions under which such defenses might be permitted).
74. Compare GATT art. XXIV, and Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XXIV, supra note 16, with DSU art. 10.
75. See PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITU-
TIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 19-20 (2004) (commenting on the erosion
of the WTO principles occurring through the proliferation of RTAs).
76. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, l 29,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
77. For a discussion of many possible solutions, see Kwak & Marceau, supra note
15.
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1. Permit/Require WTO Panels to Apply RTA Law as a Defense: WTO
panels could be permitted, where appropriate, to recognize defenses
available under an RTA. This could result in the same law being applied
by panels of the WTO or an RTA. 78
2. Forum Conveniens: Article 23 of the DSU could be amended to permit
members to determine the most convenient forum for resolving a given
dispute. 79
3. Exhaustion of Remedies: Members could agree to require parties to
either exhaust their RTA remedies before bringing a WTO dispute or to
exhaust their WTO remedies before bringing an RTA dispute. 80
4. Required Suspension of Other Forum Process: Members could negotiate
rules to permit or require the suspension of proceedings in one forum
while the other forum hears the matter.8 1
5. Article 13 of the DSU: Article 13 of the DSU, which permits panels to
request information from parties or any other source, could be invoked
to seek information, or evidence, or even rulings from an RTA
tribunal.8 2
6. Res Judicata: Article 23 could be amended to permit a panel to decline
jurisdiction if an RTA tribunal has already adjudicated the same matter.
Conclusion
Because Article 23 of the DSU gives the WTO authority to adjudicate
all alleged violations of WTO obligations and gives WTO members the
right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it would be very diffi-
cult to ask a WTO member to take its dispute to another forum, even if it
had agreed under an RTA to be subject to a parallel dispute settlement
mechanism for parallel obligations. Because the WTO, through GATT Arti-
cle XXIV, recognizes the right of members to enter into RTAs, an inherent
tension exists between members' rights under Article XXIV and their RTAs,
and their rights under the WTO's DSU. And because the number of RTAs
is growing so substantially and affecting so many WTO members' rights,
the best solution would be for WTO members to use the Doha negotiating
mandate regarding RTAs to resolve the legal relationship between these
agreements and the WTO, and to establish clear rules for addressing con-
flicts and overlaps between the dispute settlement mechanisms of the two.
Possible ways of doing so have been noted in this article, and the decision
of the Appellate Body in Brazil Tyres provides the most recent example of
why such action by WTO members is both necessary and desirable.
78. See Pauwelyn, supra note 73, at 254-55.
79. See Kwak & Marceau, supra note 15, at 8.
80. See id. at 10.
81. See id. at 10-11.
82. See id. at 9.
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